Election security covers a set of specific practices, and the measures with the strongest evidence are procedural rather than technological.
Paper records
The foundational recommendation from election security researchers.
A voter-verifiable paper record allows the electronic count to be checked against something the voter confirmed.
Which means a compromised system can be detected, and without it there is nothing to check against.
Systems producing no paper record have been phased out in many jurisdictions following sustained expert recommendation.
Risk-limiting audits
Statistical procedures examining a sample of paper records sufficient to provide high confidence that the reported outcome is correct.
Which requires fewer ballots than a full recount when margins are wide and more when they are narrow.
The method is well established, is being adopted in an increasing number of jurisdictions, and is the practical mechanism by which paper records provide assurance.
Chain of custody
Documented control of ballots, equipment and records at every stage.
Which is procedural and is what makes subsequent audit meaningful.
Seals, logs, two-person rules and observer access are the standard components.
Air gaps
Vote counting equipment not connected to networks.
Which removes a category of remote attack, and it requires physical procedures for transferring results.
Modem transmission of unofficial results is used in some jurisdictions and is a recognised risk that is generally mitigated by the official count being from physical media.
Registration systems
Databases that are networked by necessity and are therefore the more exposed component.
Which has been targeted, and compromise could disrupt voting by removing or altering records rather than by changing votes.
Backups, paper copies and provisional voting procedures mitigate this.
Observation
Party and independent observers present at counting.
Which is among the oldest and most effective safeguards, and it depends on access rules being clear and enforced.
International observation missions apply established methodologies and publish assessments.
Transparency
Publishing procedures, equipment testing, results by polling place and audit outcomes.
Which allows independent verification and is what enables confidence to be based on evidence rather than on trust.
Jurisdictions publishing granular results allow statistical checks by anyone.
Information operations
Distinct from attacks on infrastructure and generally more consequential.
Which target confidence rather than counts, and the objective is frequently to reduce trust rather than to change a result.
Responses include rapid authoritative communication, pre-emptive explanation of procedures and coordination between election officials and platforms.
What to check
Whether your jurisdiction uses paper records, conducts audits, publishes granular results and permits observation.
Which is public information, and election officials generally publish detailed procedural documentation that receives very few readers.
Voter identification
Requirements vary enormously between countries, and evidence on effects is contested.
Studies of the effect on turnout have produced mixed findings, with some finding measurable reductions among specific groups and others finding minimal effects.
Evidence on the prevalence of the impersonation these rules address consistently finds it to be very rare in systems that have studied it.
Which means the policy question is about the balance between a small measured risk and any access effect.
Postal voting
Used extensively in several countries with established safeguards including signature verification, tracking and secure return.
Evidence on fraud rates in systems using it widely finds them very low.
Recounts
Procedures for recounting vary, including automatic triggers at defined margins and requests by candidates.
Which are the formal mechanism for resolving close results, and clear rules established in advance reduce dispute.
Officials and staff
Elections are administered largely by temporary staff and volunteers.
Which means training and procedures determine consistency, and staffing shortages affect operation directly.
Harassment of election officials has been documented in several countries and has caused departures, which is a capacity risk.
Contingency planning
Procedures for equipment failure, power loss, weather disruption and other contingencies.
Which is what determines whether an incident becomes a problem, and it is planned in advance by well-run administrations.
Certification of results
The formal process by which results become official, with defined timelines and responsibilities.
Which is generally ministerial and has been the subject of disputes where the role was treated as discretionary.
Clear statutory specification of what officials must do, and when, reduces the scope for that dispute.
Confidence
Perceptions of electoral integrity are affected by elite rhetoric as much as by administration quality.
Which is documented in survey research, with confidence tracking whether a respondent's preferred party won.
Which means administrative improvement alone does not necessarily improve confidence, and this is a genuine difficulty for election officials.
International standards
Election observation methodologies and standards have been developed by international bodies and are applied consistently.
Which produces assessments that are comparable across countries and over time.
Their reports are published in full and are considerably more detailed than coverage of them.
What to do about doubts
Election authorities publish procedures, and observation is generally open to accredited representatives.
Which means concerns can be tested against the actual arrangements rather than remaining abstract.